

**CLASSIFICATION**

25X1  
SECRET

25X1

## REPORT

CD. NO.

25X1

COUNTRY Tibet/Bhutan

DATE DISTR. 2 Febuary 1953

**SUBJECT** Chinese Communist Troops on  
Northern Border of Bhutan

NO. OF PAGES 2

DATE OF INFO. 25X1

NO. OF ENCLS.  
(LISTED BELOW)

PLACE  
ACQUIRED

**SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.**

25X1

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

**THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION**

25X1

1. About the latter part of November 1952<sup>1</sup> the Chinese Communists stationed some two thousand Sino-Tibetan troops<sup>2</sup> along the northern border of Bhutan. These troops were stationed, in groups numbering approximately two hundred each, in the various passes between Bhutan and Tibet, from the pass lying between the Ha Valley and Yatung (88-53, 27-26) as far east as the pass between Punakha (89-60, 27-40) and Tibet.<sup>4</sup> Detachments were stationed in the passes between the Paro Valley<sup>5</sup> and Phari Dzong (89-10, 27-45), and between Tashi Chho Dzong (89-35, 27-30) and the Dochen Plateau<sup>6</sup>, as well as at intermediate passes.
2. It was the opinion of Bhutanese government circles that the disposition of these troops on the border was for the purpose of intimidating Bhutan, and not a preparation for the invasion of that country.<sup>7</sup>
3. The Bhutanese sent a letter of protest to the Chinese-Tibetan authorities, and at the same time accelerated the training of Bhutanese soldiers.<sup>8</sup>

25X1

25X1 1. [ ] Comment. This is an estimated date; [ ] did not state when the troops arrived.

25X1

25X1 2. [ ] Comment. [ ] did not indicate what percentage of the troops were Tibetan. Presumably the units consist mainly of Chinese soldiers.

25X1

25X1 3. [ ] Comment. On 22 December the New Delhi Times of India carried a report from Kalimpong to the effect that an additional 2,000 Chinese troops had been sent from Lhasa to the Chumbi Valley.

25X1

25X1 4. [ ] Comment. According to available maps, a route extends from

**CLASSIFICATION**

**SECRET**

[illegible]

25X1

SECRET [REDACTED]

- 2 -

Ha Dzong (89-20, 27-15) to Ch'unpei (Chumbi, 88-53, 27-28). The same map shows two routes from Punakha to Tibet, the more direct via Gasa Dzong (89-30, 27-05), and a longer route via Wangdu Phodrang (89-50, 27-30) and Byakar Dzong (90-40, 27-30). At this point the road divides, one branch extending north and crossing the border, undemarcated in this area, at approximately 90-40, 28-05, the other running northeast through Thunkar (91-00, 27-50) to Lhakhang Dzong (91-05, 28-05).

- 25X1 5. [REDACTED] Comment. The map referred to above shows roads from Pare Dzong (89-30, 27-20) extending west to Ha Dzong and thence to Ch'unpei, and east to Tashi Chho Dzong, the road from which is described below. There is also a stream extending northwest toward Phari Dzong, and the pass mentioned may lie near the head of this watercourse.
- 25X1 6. [REDACTED] Comment. According to the map, a road from Tashi Chho Dzong extends northwest and crosses the border at about 89-25, 91-55, the same pass which serves the direct route from Punakha to Tibet. In Tibet the road joins a route from Phari Dzong which runs on the east side of Sam Taho (89-22, 28-10), a lake which on another map is marked as Dochen.
- 25X1 7. [REDACTED] Comment. While it is probably true that the stationing of these troops along the border is not in preparation for an invasion of Bhutan, there may be other reasons for the move than the intimidation of Bhutan. It may be simply a movement aimed at dispersing the troops from the Yatung area, where the military concentration had become burdensome. The Bhutan border area is close at hand and affords workable land which the troops can cultivate. It may also be anticipated by the Communists in Tibet that the presence of these troops along the border may influence the Bhutanese to export to Tibet more rice, butter, meat and other foodstuffs.
- 25X1 8. [REDACTED] Comment. During the last five months of 1962 the Bhutanese Government was actively engaged in training Bhutanese citizens in the art of modern warfare. Recruits are taught to handle and fire the British Lee-Enfield caliber .303 rifle and the British .45-caliber Sten gun. Training is usually conducted in the Dzong which commands the valley in which the recruits live. Once trained, they are returned to their respective villages and replaced by new recruits. By so training a large percentage of the population, the Bhutanese hope eventually to have an army modeled after the one in Switzerland.

SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1